London's Social Housing Waiting List Grows 30% in a Decade.

May 22, 2026

New data published this week by the London Assembly should stop us in our tracks.

As of December 2025, there are 341,421 households on the social housing waiting list across London. A decade ago, that figure was 263,493. That is a 30% increase, and it is four times higher than the 7% rise recorded across the rest of England over the same period.


This is not a natural disaster. This is the predictable, documented consequence of forty years of political choices.



The stock we destroyed


Let us start with the most uncomfortable truth. The total number of council homes in London has fallen from 715,000 in 1980 to 390,000 in 2024, a 45% decrease. Over that period, 316,000 council homes were sold in London through Right to Buy. That figure is startlingly close to the 330,000 households currently stuck on waiting lists in the capital.


We sold the homes. We did not replace them. And we are still living with the consequences.


Nationally, there are now over 131,000 fewer affordable homes than when Right to Buy was introduced in 1980. The Resolution Foundation has described the near-halving of affordable homes relative to population as "largely the result of failure to replace the social housing stock lost to Right to Buy sales."  This is not a contested finding. It is settled evidence.



The borough-level reality


The London-wide figure masks extraordinary variation at borough level. Brent has seen a rise of just under 880% in the number of households on its social housing waiting list over the past decade, meaning the number is almost ten times the size it was.


That is not a statistic. That is a complete collapse of social housing supply in one of London's most densely populated, most deprived boroughs.



The human cost: one child in every classroom


When waiting lists grow and supply stays flat, families do not disappear. They end up in temporary accommodation.

The latest available data shows 74,720 households in temporary accommodation in London as of June 2025. London Councils estimates there is at least one homeless child in every London classroom.


Two-thirds of Londoners living in temporary accommodation are families with dependent children, many of whom are placed in poor-quality, overcrowded homes, often far from their schools and support networks. London Councils

We know what that does to a child's life chances. We have the evidence on educational attainment, on health outcomes, on long-term wellbeing. And we continue to allow it.



The financial collapse


This crisis is not only a human one. It is a fiscal one, and it is accelerating.


London boroughs are now spending £5.5 million a day on homelessness in 2024-25, up from £4.2 million a day the year before. The bulk of that, almost £5 million a day, goes on temporary accommodation alone. Net current expenditure on homelessness in London has risen by 42% in a single year.


Boroughs were forced to overspend their homelessness budgets by at least £330 million in 2024-25, representing a 60% increase on their original budget plans.


LSE research commissioned by London Councils found that eight London boroughs alone spent a combined £543 million on temporary accommodation in 2024-25, with all London boroughs facing an estimated £740 million funding shortfall, equivalent to £202 per household.


Critically, the amount national government reimburses councils for temporary accommodation spend has been frozen for 14 years. Councils have a legal duty to house homeless families. They cannot cap that spending. The system is designed to drain them.



The government is moving, but is it fast enough?


To be fair to the current government, it is not standing still. Right to Buy reforms announced last year will increase the qualifying tenancy period from 3 to 10 years and dramatically reduce purchase discounts. In 2024-25, local authorities reported 7,494 eligible Right to Buy sales, with only 3,593 replacement homes funded from those receipts. We are still losing more homes than we are building to replace them.


The £27.3bn Social and Affordable Homes Programme is the most significant investment in a generation, with a requirement that at least 60% of funded homes must be delivered at social rent. The King's Speech this month introduced a Social Housing Renewal Bill. These are genuine steps.


But the waiting list in London has grown by nearly 78,000 households in a decade. At the current trajectory, legislative ambition will take years to translate into homes families can actually live in.




What needs to happen


The evidence is unambiguous. We need social rent homes at genuine scale, in London and across England. We need a funding system for temporary accommodation that does not structurally bankrupt councils. And we need to stop treating a 30% rise in ten years as background noise.


Shelter's Director of Campaigns and Policy said this week: "The severe lack of social rent homes in London has left families languishing on waiting lists for years on end."


That is correct. And it will remain correct until we build the homes.


The data is in. The case is made. The question now is whether the political will matches the scale of the problem.


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By Nick Haverly April 28, 2026
Rachel Reeves is reportedly considering a one-year freeze on private rents in England, driven by the economic fallout from the Iran conflict and rising household costs. So far the conversation has focused almost entirely on the private rented sector. But what if the policy were extended — or pressure mounted to extend it — to social rents too? The answer, for housing associations and local authorities, would be deeply uncomfortable. The Numbers Already Don't Add Up Social landlords are not sitting on comfortable margins. They are simultaneously expected to retrofit ageing stock to meet decarbonisation targets, address the backlog of repairs exposed by the post-Grenfell regulatory crackdown, and build new homes to tackle a chronic shortage. All of this is funded primarily by rental income. The government's new Rent Standard, which came into force on 1 April 2026, gives social landlords a degree of certainty they have long lobbied for: annual rent increases at CPI plus 1%, and rent convergence from 2027/28, underpinned by a 10-year settlement. That settlement was not generous. It was, however, just about workable — enough to support long-term business plans and underpin future borrowing. A freeze would rip that certainty away overnight. The Borrowing Trap Housing associations borrow billions from capital markets and institutional lenders to finance development and maintenance. Their loan covenants are built around projected rental income. A sudden freeze — even a temporary one — would: Erode interest cover ratios, potentially triggering covenant breaches Force boards to pause or cancel new development programmes Increase the cost of future borrowing as lenders reprice risk Delay the very housebuilding the government has staked its reputation on For local authority Housing Revenue Accounts, the picture is equally bleak. Councils have only recently been given more borrowing headroom, and many have stretched themselves to restart council house building. A frozen rent line means frozen capacity. The Maintenance Time Bomb Beyond the balance sheet, there is a more immediate human cost. When income flatlines but costs keep rising — labour, materials, energy — something has to give. Historically, it has been repairs and maintenance. That is precisely what the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023 was designed to prevent, following years of neglect exposed after Grenfell and the death of Awaab Ishak. A rent freeze, however well-intentioned, risks putting financial pressure on the very landlords now under legal and regulatory obligation to maintain decent, safe homes. The Regulator of Social Housing would face an invidious situation: enforcing standards against landlords whose income has been curtailed by the same government demanding improvement. The Bigger Picture There is a legitimate case that social rents in some areas have crept too high relative to local incomes, and that affordability is a genuine problem for many tenants. But a blunt, short-term freeze is not the answer in a sector already stretched thin. If the government wants to protect social housing tenants from cost-of-living pressures, targeted rent rebates or enhanced housing benefit uprating would achieve that goal without destabilising the sector's finances. Freezing rents might make a headline. It would cost far more in cancelled homes, deferred repairs, and broken business plans than it could ever save tenants in a single year. The social housing sector needs long-term certainty, not short-term politics. This blog reflects the author's analysis of current reported policy discussions. The proposed rent freeze has not been confirmed by the Treasury.
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By Nick Haverly September 15, 2020
There are a many different types of company that exist, but not all of them are appropriate for all types of activity. The main corporate structures available to Councils are: Company Limited by Shares Company Limited by Guarantee Community Interest Company Community Benefit Society Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) The following paragraphs briefly describe each in more detail. Company Limited by Shares This is the usual legal form for profit-making private companies and is where shareholders buy shares that allow them to earn dividends from the company’s post tax profits. Most Council owned companies are set up as this type of company, with the Council being the main sole shareholder. They invest all of the equity in the company and therefore receive all the dividends once the company is profitable. The basic purpose and benefit of a limited company is that it creates a separate legal entity which limits the liability of the Council (or any other shareholder) if the company ever becomes insolvent. Company Limited by Guarantee This form of company has no shareholders so there is no distribution of dividends. Instead the company has Members who each guarantee to pay up to £1 towards the company’s debts. All surpluses are then re-invested in the company or the community. This is the most common form of company for not-for-profit social enterprises. It is therefore unlikely to be suitable for a private rented housing company, unless there is no intention to earn a return on the investment. Community Interest Company (CIC) A Community Interest Company is based on a conventional company model, either limited by shares or by guarantee, with two additional features designed to ensure that its activities are undertaken for the benefit of the community. Firstly, a CIC must submit to the Regulator on its formation a community interest statement that sets out the company’s benefit to the community. Secondly, the memorandum/articles of association must state that ‘the company shall not transfer any of its assets other than for full consideration’, except in cases where the assets are transferred to another asset-locked body such as another CIC or a charity, or the transfer is made ‘for the benefit of the community other than by way of a transfer of assets to an asset-locked body’. However, the regulations do make provision for the payment of capped dividends in the case of a CIC limited by shares. As a result, once again, if the intention is to provide uncapped dividends to the Council, or potentially dispose of any of the properties in the future to a non-charitable entity, then this structure might not be appropriate. Community Benefit Society This corporate form, which replaced Industrial and Provident Societies, has members rather than shareholders, and as a result there is no share capital and no distribution of dividends. These organisations are registered with the Financial Conduct Authority rather than Companies House. They can be charitable, which offers tax advantages, but are not required to be registered with the Charities Commission. As a result, this form of corporate structure would also not be appropriate for our purposes. Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Where two or more parties are working together to achieve a common objective, with the aim of combining their resources and expertise, there can be tax advantages to forming a LLP rather than creating a company limited by shares that is taxed as a separate entity. 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This week a former client asked me for advice regarding the Council using Right to Buy receipts to purchase developer-led S106 homes, following the Registered Provider pulling out of the proposed purchase from the developer. This isn't the first time that this topic has been raised so I thought I would respond more broadly, with my view. The Right to Buy scheme was introduced in 1980, to help council tenants in England buy their home at a discount. The scheme was reinvigorated from April 2012, with maximum discounts being increased from as little as £16,000 in some areas to a maximum that now stands at £82,800 across England and £110,500 in London. Since then there has been a surge in the number of homes sold under the RTB scheme - with 79,119 homes sold between 2012/13 and 2018/19. The intention of the policy, as well as to encourage home ownership, was to increase the receipts available to Local Authorities and encourage them to use those increased retained elements of the Capital receipt to invest in replacement affordable housing. There are rules about what qualifies as eligible spending and how Right to Buy Receipts can be used. Put simply, there are three ways of delivering the replacement housing: The Council builds new affordable homes, The Council acquires homes that are not already let as social or affordable housing, or The Council grants to Housing Associations or Registered Providers to deliver these new homes within the same guidelines. The wording in the original DCLG (as it was then) agreement is not overly specific on the subject of developer-led S106 sites, however given that the Local Authority is able to use such funds to provide its own 100% affordable developments and indeed it can be used to deliver the affordable element of any mixed tenure development that it wishes to undertake itself, I do not see how purchasing such S106 properties using retained Right to Buy receipts would be against the policy, providing the development has not benefited from other central government housing support. This opinion has also been tested and proven in a number of Local Authority areas over the past few years. In 2015, Epping Forest District Council entered into an agreement with Linden Homes to purchase S106 affordable properties at Barnfield in Croydon, using Right to Buy receipts and other HRA capital resources. In 2018, Brighton and Hove City Council stepped in to purchase a number of affordable homes from Developers as none of the City's five housing associations wanted to take them on. This can sometimes be due to the number of homes not being sufficient to see the RP's minimum, but also, more often of late, is that RPs are acting more commercially and being far more selective as to what properties they take on. In 2019, Cambridge City Council agreed to purchase fourteen S106 affordable homes from Hill, on its development on Clerk Maxwell Road and former Trinity College Tennis Courts In addition, London Borough of Tower Hamlets also has the purchase of Developer-led S106 affordable housing as a key option within their Strategy for using Right to Buy receipts.
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